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Abstract 
 
In an experimental 2x2 coordination game with two strict equilibria we observe that, 
in contrast to equilibrium selection theory (Harsanyi and Selten 1988), only half of the 
subjects choose the strategy that relates to the payoff- and risk-dominant equilibrium. 
We propose modified risk dominance as an explanation for the observed deviations 
from payoff and risk dominance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Coordination games are symmetric games with multiple Pareto-rankable 
equilibria. In such games equilibrium behavior requires to know which of the 
equilibria the other players are aiming at. Thus, we need a theory selecting a unique 
equilibrium. The most well-known equilibrium selection theory is the one by 
Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Their theory is based on two criteria, payoff dominance 
and risk dominance. These criteria might have opposite implications. In that case 
Harsanyi and Selten favor payoff dominance, which is based on the assumption of 
collective rationality. However, there is no general consensus on this issue. While, for 
example, also Anderlini (1990) chooses the payoff-dominant equilibrium, Carlsson 
and van Damme (1993) and Harsanyi (1995) choose the risk-dominant equilibrium. 
There exist many experimental studies examining this conflict case.1 The 
major results to be drawn out of these experiments are that pre-play communication, 
the number of players, the time horizon and the structure of interaction matters. In 
contrast to these studies, we present an experiment in which we investigate 
equilibrium selection by subjects when payoff and risk dominance predict the same 
equilibrium.  
We present an experiment that is based on a simple two-player coordination 
game in which each player chooses between two strategies. The game has two 
equilibria; of which one is both payoff and risk dominant. Subjects played this game 
once. We observe a deviation from the payoff- and risk-dominant equilibrium that is 
too great to be downgraded to noise. 
Note that our experiment is one-shot and, thus, does not allow for learning. In 
application to real world situations one might be also interested in repeated play and 
the process of learning. In our study, however, we are interested in the self-
enforcement nature of equilibria in one-shot games. 
 
                                                                 
1 Among them are Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990, 1991), Van Huyck, Gillette, 
and Battalio (1992), Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1992), Van Huyck, 
Battalio, Beil (1993), Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (1994), Brandts and MacLeod 
(1995), Cachon and Camerer (1996), Clark, Kay, and Sefton (1996), Berninghaus and 
Ehrhart (1996), Croson and Marks (1996), Keser, Ehrhart, and Berninghaus (1998). 
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We understand our experimental result as a warning that we should investigate 
more on how subjects actually choose among strategies in coordination games. 
Probably there are criteria other than risk dominance and payoff dominance that play 
an important role in equilibrium selection. For example, the security principle 
according to which players choose the strategy that maximizes their minimum 
possible payoff is proposed by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990) as a selection 
criterion. Vogt and Albers (1997) present modified risk dominance as a selection 
criterion using a numerical transformation in the perception of payoffs. This 
transformation is modeled by prominence theory (Albers 1997). We argue that 
modified risk dominance is a convincing explanation for the large number of observed 
deviations from the risk- and payoff-dominant equilibrium. 
 
 
2. The game 
 
We consider a symmetric two-player coordination game, in which each player 
chooses among strategies X and Y. The payoff matrix is presented in Figure 1. The 
game has two strict equilibria in pure strategies, (X,X) and (Y,Y). The (Y,Y)-
equilibrium is payoff dominant as 50 < 70 and risk-dominant as (50-5) < (70-20). 
Furthermore, the game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies where each player 
chooses strategy X with probability 0.526. 
 
 
 X 
 
Y 
X 50 
50 
20 
5 
Y   5 
20 
70  
70 
 
 
Figure 1: Payoff table of the symmetric coordination game 
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3. The experiments 
 
3.1 Experimental design 
 
The experiments were run at the University of Karlsruhe. After participation in 
a three-player experiment on decentralized or collective bargaining, subjects were 
invited to stay another ten minutes in our (very different) experiment. Instructions 
(see appendix) were distributed and read aloud. Subjects played the game once. They 
were not allowed to communicate and made their decision independently at their 
computer terminals. The pairing of subjects was random and anonymous. When all 
subjects had made their decisions, each participant was informed about his or her 
payoff. Payoffs were in Deutsche Mark (DM). Thus, subjects could earn a relatively 
important amount of money in a very short time. However, only one subject pair out 
of six pairs was randomly chosen for cash payment. In total, forty-eight subjects 
participated in this experiment. 
 
3.2 Experimental results 
 
Table 1 shows the frequencies with which subjects chose strategies X and Y. 
Forty-two percent of the decisions were X-choices. 
 
 
Table 1: Frequencies of X- and Y-choices 
 
# subjects # X-choices # Y-choices 
48 20 28 
 
 
Consider the null hypothesis that subjects choose strategy Y and, in the case of 
an error occurring with probability e, strategy X. For e £ 0.25 a one-sided Binomial 
test allows us to reject the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level. Thus we may 
conclude that the observed frequency of X-decisions cannot simply be due to errors.  
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4. Modified risk dominance 
 
If subjects followed only risk and payoff dominance, they should have chosen 
strategy Y. We observe, however, that subjects significantly deviate from this 
prediction. Are there equilibrium selection theories that would predict the choice of X 
in our game? Let us consider modified risk dominance (Vogt and Albers 1997) which  
is based on prominence theory (Albers 1997). 
 
4.1 Prominence Theory 
 
Prominence theory is based on the empirical observation that some numbers 
are easier accessible than others. The most easily accessible numbers in the decimal 
system are called the prominent numbers P which are: 
 
P = {n*10z|zÎZ, nÎ{1,2,5}} = {...,0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100,....}. 
 
The next accessible numbers are the spontaneous numbers S which are 
 
S = {n*10z|zÎZ, nÎ{-7, -5, -3, -2, -1.5, -1, 0, 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 5, 7}}. 
 
The spontaneous numbers include the prominent numbers and one additional number 
between any two neighbored prominent numbers in the negative and positive range. 
In prominence theory the perception of numbers (for example, the payoffs in a 
game) is described by “steps“. By definition, the difference between any two 
neighbored prominent numbers (ordered according to their size) is one step. 
Accordingly, the difference between any two neighbored spontaneous numbers 
(ordered according to their size) is half a step.  
In specific tasks (contexts) different smallest amounts of money are important. 
For example, in decisions in the context of the annual budget of a state, $1 billion 
might be perceived as the smallest „important“ amount, whereas it might be between 
$1 to $5 for the price of a dinner. In prominence theory this is modeled by assuming a 
“finest perceived full step“ unit D. The difference between zero and this number is 
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perceived as one step. The step structure and the finest perceived full step defines, up 
to an additive constant, a perception function vD. By normalizing vD(0) = 0, we get 
the function presented in Table 2 for D = 20 and the spontaneous numbers between  
–100 and +100. 
 
 
Table 2: 
Transformation of the spontaneous numbers between -100 and 100  
by the vD-function for D = 20 
 
number:  -100,  -70,  -50,  -30,  -20,   -15,   -10,     -5,   0,     5,   10,    15,   20,   30,   50,   70,  100 
v20  :          -3, -2.5,    -2, -1.5,    -1,-0.75,  -0.5,-0.25,   0, 0.25, 0.5,  0.75,    1,  1.5,     2,   2.5,     3     
 
 
Note that for numbers x > D the function vD(x) is (nearly) equal to 
3*log(x/D)+1. Below the smallest unit D the function is linear2.  
In a specific task (e.g. the experimental game) the finest perceived full step D 
has to be determined. Prominence theory proposes the following rule: D is the 
prominent number that is two steps below the smallest prominent number greater than 
or equal to the maximal payoff in the task.  
 
 
4.2 The selection criterion 
 
Let us consider the symmetric bimatrix game presented in Figure 2 of which 
the game examined in our experiment is a special case. The strategies are denoted by 
X and Y. For the payoffs it holds that a > b > c > d. The equilibrium points are (X,X) 
and (Y,Y); (Y,Y) is payoff dominant. 
 
                                                                 
2 This description of the perception is similar to the Weber-Fechner law (for example, 
in G.T. Fechner 1968) which describes the perception of stimuli in psychophysics. 
Above a smallest unit, the perception is proportional to a logarithmic function. 
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 X 
 
Y 
X b 
b 
c 
d 
Y d 
c 
a 
a 
 
 
Figure 2: A symmetric 2x2 game 
 
 
We apply the criterion of modified risk dominance proposed by Vogt and 
Albers (1997). For this symmetric game the criterion of modified risk dominance is 
obtained from the concept of risk dominance by the application of the vD-function to 
the payoffs. 
The criterion of risk dominance is: 
 
 (X,X) dominates (Y,Y) iff b – d > a – c.  
 
Replacing the payoffs by the perceived payoffs (resulting from the application of the 
vD-function) we obtain the criterion of modified risk dominance: 
 
 (X,X) dominates (Y,Y) iff  vD(b) – vD(d) > vD(a) – vD(c). 
 
The application of the vD-function does not effect the ordering of the payoffs 
as it is a monotonic transformation. Thus, the (Y,Y)-equilibrium remains payoff 
dominant. 
 
Prediction 
 
For the prediction of this model the finest perceived full step D has to be 
determined according to the rule of prominence theory: The maximal payoff is 70. 
The smallest prominent number greater than or equal to 70 is 100. D is two steps 
below 100. This results in D = 20. Thus, Table 2 (presented in Section 4.1 above) can 
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be used for the transformation of the payoffs. The transformed payoffs for the 
experimental game in Figure 1 are presented in Figure 3. 
 
 
 X 
 
Y 
X 2 
2 
1 
0.25 
Y 0.25 
1 
2.5 
2.5 
 
 
     Figure 3: The transformed payoffs 
 
Applying the criterion of the modified risk dominance to this game leads to the 
following result. 
 
 (X,X) dominates (Y,Y), 
since 
 vD(b) – vD(d) = 2 – 0.25 = 1.75   >   1.5 = 2.5 – 1 = vD(a) – vD(c). 
 
Thus, the criterion of the modified risk dominance predicts that the equilibrium (X,X) 
is selected in our game.  
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
In the literature we find other principles that might explain the choice of 
strategy X in our game. Among them are the security principle (Van Huyck, Battalio, 
and Beil 1990) and the selection of mixed strategies. 
Subjects following the security principle always select the so-called secure 
action. The secure action is the strategy that maximizes the minimum possible payoff. 
In our game the secure action is strategy X. The choices of X observed in our 
experiment could be interpreted with the security principle. However, other studies 
show much less importance of this principle (Vogt and Albers 1997, Brandts and 
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MacLeod 1995). They observe that payoffs other than the minimal guaranteed one 
can have a great impact on the choices of subjects. Thus, we conclude that the 
security principle can be only part of an explanation. Note that the security principle 
can be regarded as an “ingredient” of modified risk dominance. Using the notation of 
Figure 3, the security principle compares the payoffs c and d in a similar way to 
modified risk dominance. However, modified risk dominance includes the additional 
comparison of payoffs a and b. 
One might argue that subjects play mixed strategies. Following Nash (1950), 
mixed strategies should be interpreted in terms of a state in a population where each 
player chooses a pure strategy but the relative frequency with which each pure 
strategy is chosen corresponds to its probability in the mixed strategy equilibrium. 
This interpretation is not convincingly applicable to our one-shot game. It could 
probably make sense in repeated play or a learning environment (see, for example, 
Oechssler 1995). Although in the experiment subjects have to decide on a pure 
strategy, one might assume that each subject chooses a pure strategy based on the 
outcome of a lottery prior to the experiment. Given this assumption, which is strongly 
criticized in the literature, we might conclude that the probability of X in this lottery 
was 0.42, a number fairly close to the mixed strategy equilibrium prediction. It had to 
be explained, however, why they should select the mixed strategy equilibrium and not 
the payoff- and risk-dominant (Y,Y)-equilibrium. The mixed strategy equilibrium is 
payoff dominated even by the (X,X)-equilibrium.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In our experimental coordination game we observe that an equilibrium that is 
neither payoff dominant nor risk dominant is selected by almost fifty percent of the 
subjects. Among all equilibrium selection theories known to us only modified risk 
dominance predicts this dominated equilibrium. Given our experimental evidence and 
given that in previous studies (Vogt and Albers 1997) modified risk dominance 
appears to be a better predictor for the equilibrium selection in 2x2 games than risk 
dominance we conclude that the concept of modified risk dominance should be 
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included in the on-going discussion on equilibrium selection in coordination games 
which is typically focussed on the notions of risk dominance and payoff dominance. 
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